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1 Introduction
Recently many developed countries face the declining birth rate and in-
creasing longevity. Decreasing young population is a matter of public concern
in these countries because it decreases labor force in the future and reduces
the contributions to the social security system. Policy makers aim at increas-
ing the population growth rate and the ratio of economically active workers
to total population by various public investments in children e.g., child al-
lowances, social security system and public education. Some literature dealt
with public nanced child care policy in an overlapping generations model.
For example, van Groezen et al (2003) analyzes the relation between child
care subsidy, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system and fertility. But
these literature ignore a child quality issue. Becker and Lewis (1973) shows
a quality-quantity trade-o of fertility choice. Parents face a trade-o be-
tween having many children and spending large resources on their quality
e.g., health and education, of each children. If parents decide fertility and
education jointly, government investment in children not only has an eect
on their fertility choice also aects human capital accumulation.
Few studies examine the eects of public education policy on private
investment in education and fertility and growth under PAYG social secu-
rity system. de la Croix and Doepke (2004) extended Kaganovich and Zilcha
(1992) to examine the choice of an education regime in an endogenous growth
model with endogenous fertility choice. They show that at public education
regime economic growth rate is higher and income inequality is lower than at
private education regime. But their analysis is limited to two polar school-
ing systems i.e., the government or household only supplies the educational
investment in their articles. Under public education regime, parents are in-
dividually not allowed to choose the level of education for their children. In
reality, in many developed countries private education coexists with public
education. Table 1 shows the percentage of private investment in education










Table 1: The percentage of private investment in education to total educa-
tional expenditure in OECD countries by level of education (primary, sec-
ondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education and tertiary education).
The data are from OECD (2010a).
The issue addressed in this paper are as follows: how a change in the
allocation between public investment in education and PAYG social security
benets aects fertility and growth ? This paper extends de la Croix and
Doepke (2003) to investigate the eect of public education on fertility by
introducing the parental fertility decision and the child quality issue into a
three-period-lived overlapping generations model with PAYG social security
system. Dierently from previous works, I assume that private education
coexists with public education. Government nances two public program;
PAYG social security program and public education program.This paper in-
vestigates the eects of an increase in public funding for children's education
on the parent's fertility and educational decision1.
The main results are as follows. There is an inverted U-shaped relation be-
tween public investment in education and fertility. And an V-shaped relation
between public education and growth appear. Small sized public education
policy generates a substitution eect from quality of children to quantity of
children in contradiction to Zhang (1997). On the contrary, in the case in
which the size is suciently high, increasing public investment in education
decreases fertility and stimulates per capita output growth for a given PAYG
1But I ignore income inequality to maintain tractability of the model.
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contribution rate by reducing PAYG social security benets..
This paper is similar to some previous papers that study the relation be-
tween private and public investment in education. Kaganovich and Zilcha
(1999) studies the eects of public education policy on private educational
choice, welfare and growth. Golmm and Kaganovich (2003) explores the
relationship between parental educational and public investment in human
capital formation. But they ignore the response of fertility to public educa-
tion policy. Omori (2010) built a overlapping generations model with two
intergenerational transfer program and endogenous fertility choice. But with
their modeling public education policy have a monotonic eect on fertility
rate and it does not examine the eect of public education policy on per
capita output growth.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model used
in this article. Section 3 examines fertility rate and per capita output growth
rate in the balanced growth path. Section 4 devotes to show the eects of
public education on fertility and growth analytically. The last section oers
some concluding remarks.
2 Model
Time is discrete and goes from 0 to innite. Consider a closed-economy that
is populated by overlapping generations of people who live for three periods.
Each individual lives for three periods; childhood, adulthood and old-age. He
receives education in the rst period, works, rears and educates children in
the second period and retires in the third period. The length of each period
is normalized to one. All decisions are made in the adulthood period of life.
Individuals care about adulthood consumption ct, old-age consumption dt+1,
their number of children nt, and the human capital of children et. Total
population Pt evolves over time according to Pt+1 = ntPt.
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2.1 Household
Preference of any individual in generation t are given by:
log ct + β log dt+1 + γ log ntht+1, (1)
where ct, dt+1 are consumption proles of generation t. The parameter 0 <
β < 1 is a psychological discount factor and 0 < γ < 1 is a altruism factor.
Raising one child takes a constant fraction 0 < ϕ < 1 of an adult's time.
This fraction of time is exogenous and constant. An adult has to choose
consumption proles ct and dt+1, saving for old-age st, number of children
nt, and private educational investment per child et. The budget constraint
for the adulthood period is2:
ct = (1− τ) {(1− ϕnt)wtht − etntwtht} − st,
The budget constraint for the old-age period is:
dt+1 = Rt+1st + Tt+1,
Using these budget constraints, I have a lifetime budget constraint as follows:
(1− τ) {(1− ϕnt)wtht − etntwtht}+ Tt+1/Rt+1 = ct + dt+1/Rt+1. (2)
The human capital of generation t+1 depends on the human capital of their
parents ht, the public education investment Et and the private education
investment et. The human capital of generation t + 1 is assumed to be
produced as follows:
ht+1 = µ(Et + et)
ηht. (3)
2I assume that private educational spending for children is tax-deductible in the same
way as de la Croix and Doepke (2003). This assumption is not essential to my main
results.
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Here h ≡ H/P represents per capita human capital. µ is a eciency parame-
ter and 0 < η < 1. The public educational investment in children is obtained
for free and perfectly substitutes to the educational investment provided by
their parents3. The private investment in children's education e has to be
paid for by their parents.
Given the wage rate wt, the price of physical capital Rt+1, the human
capital level ht, the child rearing time per child ϕ, the policies of govern-
ment, individuals during adulthood period in generation t choose st, nt, et to
maximize their lifetime utility Eq. (1). To nd the solution to the household
maximization problem, I solve the following Kuhn-Tucker problem:
max
c,d,e,n
log ct + β log dt+1 + γ log ntht+1
+λ1 {(1− τ)(1− ϕntwtht − etntwtht) + Tt+1/Rt+1 − ct − dt/Rt+1}
+λ2et,












= λ1(1− τ)(ϕ+ et)wtht,
γη
Et + et




= (1− τ)(1− ϕntwtht − etntwtht),
λ2et = 0.
3Public education policy act as the device that enhance the eciency of human capital
formation in Omori (2010) and Fanti and Gori (2011). In contrast, public investment in
education is substituting for private input in Zhang (1997) and Azarnert (2010).
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1 + β + γ
)
{β(1− τ)wtht − (1 + γ)Tt+1/Rt+1}. (4)
If the return on private investment in education is higher than the return
of quantity of children, parents invest a part of their disposal income in
education et > 0. However, if the return on private investment in education
is below the return of quantity of children, a corner solution et = 0 exists.
An optimal non-corner solution for the number of children and the parental
investment in children's education at time t is given by:
nt = γ̂(1− η)
(1− τ)wtht + Tt+1/Rt+1







{η(1− τ)ϕwtht − Et}. (6)
The relation between private and public investment in education is illustrated
in Figure 1. Public education system generates a substitution eect from
quality of children to quantity of children and there is a negative relation
between private and public investment in education. The optimal corner
solution for the number of children and the parental investment in education
at time t is:
nt = γ̂
(1− τ)wtht + Tt+1/Rt+1
(1− τ)ϕwtht
, (7)
et = 0, (8)
where γ̂ ≡ γ
1+β+γ
. Notice that fertility at equilibrium is positively related to
lifetime income i.e., the wage earned during the adulthood period of life and
PAYG social security benets during the old-age period of life, and negatively











Figure 1: The relation between public and private investment in education
2.2 Firm




where Kt is the aggregate physical capital and Lt is the aggregate labor
supply at time t. Parameter 0 < α < 1 is expressed as the share of physical
capital in production. Physical capital depletes completely after one period
use in production. The rm chooses inputs by maximizing prots Yt−wtLt−
RtKt at time t. From the rst order conditions for prot maximization, factor
prices are derived as follows:
















I assume that the government behaves under a balanced budget restriction.
Two policies are funded by income tax τ collected at constant rate. I dene
a parameter χ which represents the fraction of government revenue devoted
to public investment in education. Public investments in education policy
and PAYG social security policy in period t is given by:
TtPt−1 = τ(1− χ)Ltwt, (11)
EtwthtPt = τχLtwt, (12)
where Tt is the per capita PAYG social security benet and Et is the per
child public nanced education expenditure in period t. In the following
discussions, the government predetermines the sequences of education tax
rate τ and fraction χ.
2.4 Markets
The equilibrium conditions in the physical capital market and the labor
market are written as:
Kt+1 = stPt, (13)
Lt = Pt (1− ϕnt − etnt)ht. (14)
Now I can dene the competitive equilibrium in our model as follows:
Denition 1 Competitive Equilibrium:
Given the initial aggregate physical capital K0, the initial stock of aggre-
gate human capital H0, the initial population size P0, an equilibrium consists
of sequences of household's decision rules{ct, dt+1, st, nt, et}∞t=0, sequences of
prices {wt, Rt}∞t=0, government expenditure {Et, Tt+1}∞t=0 and aggregate quan-
tities {Kt+1, Lt}∞t=0 such that
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1. the households' decision rules {ct, dt+1, st, nt, et}∞t=0 maximizes lifetime
utility function (1) subject to the lifetime budget constraint (2) and the hu-
man capital formation function (3);
2. the factor prices {wt, Rt}∞t=0 are such that markets clear, i.e., (9) and (10)
hold;
3. the government expenditures {Et, Tt+1}∞t=0 hold (11) and (12);
4. the aggregate valuables {Kt+1, Lt}∞t=0 hold (13) and (14).
3 Fertility and Growth
In this section, I derive the fertility rate and the per capita output growth
rate in the balanced growth path.
3.1 Fertility
From Eq. (4) and (13), the equilibrium condition in the capital market at




1 + β + γ
)
{β(1− τ)wtht − (1 + γ)Tt+1/Rt+1}Pt. (15)
Using Eq. (9) and Eq. (11), the present value of per capita social security
benet at time t is given by:






Substituting Eq. (16) into (15) for the aggregated physical capital dynamics,
I have:
Kt+1 = S(τ, χ)(1− τ)wthtPt, (17)
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where S(τ, χ) represents the saving rate at equilibrium:
S(τ, χ) ≡ β
{








From Eq. (5), (6), (7), (8) and (14), the labor supply at time t is given by:
Lt = L(τ, χ)htPt. (18)
where L(τ, χ) represents the working time of parents and is given by:
L(τ, χ) ≡ 1− γ̂
{








Notice that the labor supply does not depend on the private educational
decision of parents. Using Eq. (12) and (18), per child public education





where Ẽ = τχL(τ, χ). Next I derive the fertility rate at the competitive
equilibrium. First, suppose that parents in period t invest a part of their
disposal income in education i.e., et > 0. I term this case as the mixed




γ̂(1− η)(1 + T (τ, χ)) + Ẽ(τ, χ)
}
ϕ−1 ≡ n∗mix, (19)
where






Second, suppose that parents in period t invest nothing in their children's
human capital accumulation i.e., et = 0. In this situation, parents nd it
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optimal to leave their children to the public education institution completely.
They use all adulthood period resources to consumption, saving and child-
rearing. I term this situation as the complete public education case. From
Eq. (7), optimal number of children at the equilibrium is as follows:
nt = γ̂(1 + T (τ, χ))ϕ
−1 ≡ n∗pub. (20)
The number of children is constant over time in this model.
Lemma 1 For all contribution rate τ ∈ (0, 1) and fraction χ ∈ [0, 1], a rise
in the PAYG social security contribution rate τ(1− χ) increases fertility n∗.








Figure 2: The function Φ(τ, χ)
In order to investigate under what conditions parents privately invest
in their children's education, I derive a inner solution condition for private






Arranging above condition, the following lemma provides a necessary and
sucient condition for parental private investment in the balanced growth
path.
Lemma 2 Parents invest in their children's quality if and only if the size of
public investment in education τχ satises:
τχ <
ηγ̂(1 + T (τ, χ))
1− γ̂(1 + T (τ, χ))
≡ Φ(τ, χ). (21)
Φ(τ, χ) is a positive function of the PAYG social security contribution rate
τ(1 − χ). Figure 2 illustrates the threshold level Φ(τ, χ). Φ(τ, 1) is the
threshold value before applying the PAYG social security system. If the size
of public education τχ is larger than the threshold level Φ(τ, χ), parents do
not invest their children's quality privately. However, if the size of public
education is lowers than it, parents invest a part of their disposal income in
their children's education. From Eq. (19) and (20) I obtain the fertility rate
in the balanced growth path as follows:
n∗ =
{
{γ̂(1− η)(1 + T (τ, χ)) + E(τ, χ)}ϕ−1 ≡ n∗mix (χ < χ̃),
γ̂(1 + T (τ, χ))ϕ−1 ≡ n∗pub (χ̃ ≤ χ).
(22)
where χ̃ means the fraction which satises the equation τ χ̃ = Φ(τ, χ̃). Next
I examine the dynamics in this model.
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3.3 Dynamics







(1− α)kαt . (23)
From the assumption 0 < α < 1, this dynamics always converges to the
capital/labor ratio k monotonously.
k =
{





Using the Production technology and Eq. (18), per capita output growth
rate at time t is written as follows:












In the balanced growth path, the capital/labor ratio is constant kt = kt+1 =
k. Per capita output growth rate in the balanced growth path can be written
as follows:
1 + g∗ =
{
µη̂(ϕ− Emix(τ, χ))η ≡ 1 + g∗mix (χ < χ̃),
µEpub(τ, χ)
η ≡ 1 + g∗pub (χ̃ ≤ χ),
(25)
where
Emix(τ, θ) ≡ Ẽ(τ, χ)/n∗mix,





In this section, I examine the eect of reallocating public funds from
PAYG social security benets to public investment in education on fertility
in the balanced growth path. I impose following parameter restrictions of
the model:
Assumption 1
γ̂ < α , τ < 0.5, η < 0.5.
I can show the eect of public education on fertility in the balanced growth







Panel (A) Panel (B)
χ～ ～
Figure 3: The eect of reallocating public funds from PAYG social security
benets to public investment in education on fertility rate and per capita
output growth rate.
Proposition 1 Assuming that the tax rate is constant, if the size of public
investment in education is suciently small i.e., χ < χ̃, a reallocation public
funds from PAYG social security benets to pubic education increases fertility
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rate n∗mix. On the contrary, if the size of public investment in education is
suciently large i.e., χ̃ ≤ χ, a reallocation public funds from PAYG social
security benets to pubic education decreases fertility rate n∗pub.
Proof 1 See Appendix.
Figure 3(A) summarizes the impact of public investment in education
on fertility, where n0 denotes the fertility rate if public education scheme
does not exist. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. If χ < χ̃,
reallocating public nancial resources from PAYG social security policy to
public education policy has three eects on fertility: (1) a positive direct
eect that increases fertility by reducing per child education cost, (2) a nega-
tive direct eect that decreases fertility by reducing parent's lifetime budget,
(3) a positive indirect eect that increases fertility by increasing per child
public education expenditure. Two positive eects dominate a negative ef-
fect under Assumption 1. This results is similar to Azarnert (2010) which
studies the eect of free public education on fertility, private educational in-
vestments, and human capital accumulation at dierent stages of economic
development. In this paper, the availability of free public schooling crowds
out public education investment, stimulates fertility and impedes growth at
advanced stages of development.If χ̃ ≤ χ, a change in the allocation from
PAYG social security policy to public education policy has a direct negative
eect on fertility by reducing PAYG social security benets.
Next, I examine how reallocating public nancial resources from PAYG
social security benets to public investment in education aects per capita
output growth rate in the balanced growth path. From Eq. (22), I derive
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assuming that the wage tax rate is constant, if the size of
public investment in education is small i.e., χ < χ̃, a reallocation public funds
from PAYG social security benets to public investment in education slows
per capita output growth (1 + g∗mix). On the contrary, if the size of public
investment is suciently large i.e., χ̃ ≤ χ, a reallocation public funds from
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PAYG social security benets to pubic investment in education stimulates per
capita output growth (1 + g∗pub).
Proof 2 See Appendix.
Figure 3(B) summarizes the impact of public investment in education on
per capita output growth rate, where (1+g0) denotes the growth rate if pub-
lic education scheme does not exist. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as
follows. From Eq. (25), per capita output growth rate depends on per child
public investment in education E in the balanced growth path. If the size
of public investment in education is small, a reallocating from PAYG social
security benets to public investment in education has three eects on per
child public education expenditure: (1) a positive direct eect that increases
public education expenditure by increasing the educational contribution rate,
(2) a negative indirect eect that decreases public education expenditure by
decreasing labor supply and the tax base, (3) a negative indirect eect that
decreases per child public education expenditure by stimulating fertility rate.
A rst positive direct eect dominate other negative eects.
On the contrary, if the size of public investment in education is suciently
large, reallocating public funds from PAYG social security benets to pub-
lic investment in education has three dierent eects on per capita public
education expenditure: (1) a positive direct eect that increases public ed-
ucation expenditure by increasing the educational contribution rate, (2) a
negative indirect eect that reduces household's labor supply and tax base,
(3) a positive indirect eect that increases per capita out public education
expenditure by reducing the number of child. Two positive eects always
dominates a negative indirect eect.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the eects of an increase in public funding for educa-
tion on the parental fertility and educational decision and per capita output
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growth rate in the balanced growth path. The model used in this study is
the three-period-lived overlapping generation model, incorporating both the
trade-o between the quality and quantity of children. Government nances
PAYG social security program and public education program. Similar to
Zhang (1997) and Azarnert (2010), this paper assumes public input in edu-
cation is substituting for private input at producing children's human capital.
First, this paper showed that under what conditions parents invest in their
children's quality privately. Dierently from previous studies, there are two
dierent cases. When the size of public education expenditure is suciently
low and per child public investment in education is not large, parents ed-
ucate their children privately. On the other hand, when per child public
educational investment is suciently large, parents leave their children's ed-
ucation to public education institution completely.
Second, I examine the eect of reallocating public funds from PAYG social
security benets to public investment in education on fertility and per capita
output growth in the balanced growth rate. When parents invest their chil-
dren's education privately, public investment in education increases fertility
and impede growth. However when parents do not invest their children's
education at all, a higher public investment in education decreases fertility
rate and stimulate growth.
Appendix
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Proof of Proposition 1






{γ(1− η)− τχγ} ∂T (τ, χ)
∂χ






1− γ̂ + γ̂α̂
{




where α̂ ≡ 1−α
α
. Under assumption 1 the rst part of proposition 1 is obvious.
2. Now the proof of second part of Proposition 1 straightforwardly derives









< 0, the second part of proposition 1 is obvious. 2
Proof of Proposition 2














< 0 and 0 < ∂E(τ,χ)
∂χ
, the rst part of proposition 2 is obvious.
2. Next I consider the latter part of proposition 2. I calculate the following













In the same way as the rst part of proposition 2, the second part is obvious.
2
References
[1] Azarnert, L. V., 2010. Free education, fertility and human capital accu-
mulation. Journal of Population Economics 23, 449-468.
[2] Becker, G. S., Lewis, H. G., 1973. On the interaction between the quan-
tity and quality of children. Journal of Political Economy 81, S279-S288.
[3] de la Croix, D., Doepke, M., 2003. Inequality and growth: Why dier-
ential fertility matters. American Economic Review 93(4), 1091-1113.
[4] de la Croix, D., Doepke, M., 2004. Public versus private education when
dierential fertility matters. Journal of Development Economics 73, 607-
629.
[5] Fanti, L., Gori, L., 2010. Public education, fertility incentives, neoclassi-
cal economic growth and welfare. Bulletin of Economic Research 62(1),
59-77.
[6] Fanti, L., Gori, L., 2008. Child quality choice and fertility disincentives.
Economic Bulletin 10(7), 1-6.
[7] Fanti, L., Gori, L., 2008. Human capital, income, fertility and child
policy. Economic Bulletin 9(6), 1-7.
[8] Glomm, G., Ravilumar, B., 1992. Public versus private investment in
human capital: Endogenous growth and income inequality. Journal of
Political Economy 100(4), 818-834.
[9] Glomm, G., Kaganovich, M., 2003. Distributional Eects of Public Ed-
ucation in an Economy with Public Pensions. International Economic
Review 44(3), 917-937.
[10] Groezen, B., Leers, T., Meijidam, L., 2003. Social security and endoge-
nous fertility: pensions and child allowances as Siamese twins. Journal
of Public Economics. 87(2), 233-251.
20
[11] Groezen, B., Meijdam, L., 2008. Growing old and staying young: popula-
tion policy in an aging closed economy. Journal of Population Economics
21, 573-588.
[12] Kaganovic, M., Zilcha, I., 1999. Education, social security and growth.
Journal of Public Economics 71, 289-209.
[13] Omori, T., 2009. Eects of public education and social security on fer-
tility. Journal of Population Economics 22, 585-601.
[14] OECD., 2012a. Education at a Glance 2012 OECD Indicators.
[15] OECD., 2012b. OECD Family Database, OECD, Paris
(www.oecd.org/social/family/database).
[16] OECD., 2012c. OECD Factbook 2013 Economic, Environmental and So-
cial Statistics (www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/oecd-factbook-
statistics).
[17] Yakita, A., 2001. Uncertain lifetime, fertility and social security. Journal
of Population Economics 14, 635-640.
[18] Yakita, A., 2010. Human capital accumulation, fertility and economic
development. Journal of Economics 99, 97-116.
[19] Zhang, J., 1997. Fertility, growth, and public investments in children.
The Canadian Journal of Economics 30(4a), 835-843.
[20] Wigger, B., 1999. Pay-as-you-go nanced public pensions in a model of
endogenous growth and fertility. Jounal of Population Economics. 12,
625-640.
21
